Freespeech » about ♀
This web page is last updated at 2019-9-13 around 23:05 by Priscilla Felicia Harmanus, 1993 from the Netherlands
.png/scale?_=169f57ae9b8 "following Bob")
This speech is about the process towards freedom & how I do my computing(1993)¹, the
🎥Free Software movement² and Monitoring Bob's(1970) Autistic hobby³.
❝Bob(1970) is switching between multiple operating systems❞
❝ Bob has setting up GNU Ubuntu/Linux on the ex-girlfriends computer, However, Bob boots the computer that belongs to his mother witch whose model is a Pavilion G7 running Microsoft Windows 8 that has been released in the year of 2012. Windows 8 is a personal computer operating system that was produced by Microsoft as part of the Windows NT family of operating systems. In the year of 2016 while Bob's computer was doing an update while I was there at Bob's place(old stuff new house), I've noticed on the computer screen during the update that it had detected Microsoft Windows XP Professional.
Back then I did not know anything about OS and network computing. My parents and I had to grew up with windows you know just like you and your friends had to grew up with windows that if we went to the store and buy a computer you know... windows is pre-installed, windows is required that if we all want starting using a computer we need to pay for the windows license and need to agree with the terms in order to could use the computer that we had to buy in the store. ❞
While it seemed to be that windows is the only choice that we had to believe in, it was and it was not because there is still an option to consider and that is to ☯ 📚 build your own PC. 📚☯
-min.png/scale?_=16c96b4cc98 "2017-3-21")
²How I met Ubuntu/Linux ♣ Look and feel
³Due to security concerns, the person's name will be referred to as “Bob” in this report of investigation. Bob is a person with high-technical skills. Read more about Bob. Also the person's username@email will be referred as "pob.bob@email". POB = Place Of Birth.
❝Bob hates windows updates and therefore loves lunix❞ | ❝Priscilla asks questions and Bob provides answers❞ |
eyerys.com - Gmail was launched as an invitation-only beta release on April 1, 2004 and it became available to the general public on February 7, 2007.¹
bob - 2007 May 4: Subject: Download ubuntu iso(Gmail)📚¹
gplv3.fsf.org - 2007 June 29: GPLv3 and LGPLv3 have been released! - You can watch the video of Richard Stallman announcing the release and giving an overview of the major changes at the FSF's Boston office on June 29, 2007.
The History of Operating Systems & The Free Software Movement📚
¹to be continued
PSP: A Framework to Allocate Resources to Power Storage Systems under Cyber- Physical Attacks
5th International Symposium for ICS & SCADA Cyber Security Research 2018 (ICS-CSR 2018)
29 - 30 August 2018, University of Hamburg, Germany.
PAPER FORMATS
PDF Version of this Paper 293(kb)
Bob had carved out a job running a recycling program, a gig that earned him nicknames like “The Garbage Man.” It was an apt description: Bob, the engineer, sometimes worked 14 hours straight and sorted, by his estimate, tens of thousands of pounds of trash over the years.
JUDY WOODRUFF: You buy a new smartphone or computer, and you take your old one to a local recycler. It’s the green thing to do, right. Well, it turns out a lot of those devices may not be getting recycled at all.
harde schijf+sterke magneet=??
| Inmates Build Computers From Recycled Parts, Hide in Ceiling |
This speech is about the process towards freedom & how I do my computing¹, the
Free Software movement² and Monitoring Bob's Autistic hobby³.
❝Bob(1970) is switching between multiple operating systems❞
This web page is last updated at 2019-9-13 around 23:05 by Priscilla Felicia Harmanus, 1993 from the Netherlands
en.wikipedia.org - This article presents a timeline of events in the history of Microsoft Windows operating systems from 1985.
webopedia.com - The History Of Windows Operating Systems
https://uclouvain.be/en/research-institutes/icteam/research-directions.html
https://nl.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alice_en_Bob
http://web.mit.edu/jemorris/humor/alice-and-bob
gnu.org - Frequently Asked Questions about the GNU Licenses
fsf.org - Free Software Resources
doc.lagout.org - Hacking Into Computer Systems - A Beginners Guide 2018 by Rubin Heath (Author)
dicosmo.org - Hijacking the World: The Dark Side Of Microsoft 1999
academia.eu - Webserver Operating Systems may 7, 2013
doc.lagout.org - Programmable Controllers - Theory and Implementation 1988 - 1997
doc.lagout.org - Operating System Internals and Design Principles
Asking the companies about the most typical way they will be compromised, most answer this that it will be an inside employee.
When looking at the attacker that will be most likely to attack the ICS infrastructure the insider is one of the most likely attackers. Industrial spies will be next most likely followed by breaking into the system, denial of services and man in the middle attack.
Results for “computers systems and operating systems used in your companies industrial control system (ICS) environment”
Most used operating system is Windows XP followed by Windows 7. 27,27% of the respondents are using other operating systems than Windows. When different than Windows it is Linux. 63,64% uses normal desktop computers and 36,36% for the respondents also use industrial computer systems. In 50% of the cases there is an anti-virus package installed on the computer. In the ICS invironment are in 50% of the respondents also computer present that are not primary used for the ICS.
In the world of cyber crime and high tech crime we usually think about things like internet and banking fraud, child pornography, cyber bullying 1, hacking 2 of computer systems, distributed denial of services 3 and defacing 4 .
security awareness
Denial of Engineering Operations Attacks in Industrial Control Systems
We present a new type of attack termed denial of engineering operations in which an attacker can interfere with the normal cycle of an engineering operation leading to a loss of situational awareness. Specifically, the attacker can deceive the engineering software during attempts to retrieve the ladder logic program from a programmable logic controller (PLC) by manipulating the ladder logic on the PLC, such that the software is unable to process it while the PLC continues to execute it successfully. This attack vector can provide sufficient cover for the attacker»s actual scenario to play out while the owner tries to understand the problem and reestablish positive operational control. To enable the forensic analysis and, eventually, eliminate the threat, we have developed the first decompiler for ladder logic programs.
Ladder logic is a graphical programming language for PLCs that control physical processes such as power grid, pipelines, and chemical plants; PLCs are a common target of malicious modifications leading to the compromise of the control behavior (and potentially serious consequences). Our decompiler, Laddis, transforms a low-level representation to its corresponding high-level original representation comprising of graphical symbols and connections. The evaluation of the accuracy of the decompiler on the program of varying complexity demonstrates perfect reconstruction of the original program. We present three new attack scenarios on PLC-deployed ladder logic and demonstrate the effectiveness of the decompiler on these scenarios.
Programmable logic controllers (PLCs) are embedded devices used in industrial control systems (ICS) to automate the control and monitoring of physical industrial and infrastructure processes such as gas pipelines, nuclear plants, power grids, and wastewater treat- ment facilities [11]. Thus, their safety, durability, and predictable response times are the primary design concerns. Unfortunately, they are not designed to be resilient against cyberattacks [10]. If a PLC is compromised, the physical process controlled by the PLC is also compromised which could lead to a catastrophic incident.
To compromise a PLC, an attacker in ltrates into an ICS network to communicate with the PLC, or gains physical access of the PLC to communicate using local USB or serial ports. The attacker may attempt to modify either the rmware (or the operating system) of the PLC, or the control logic (typically written in the languages de ned by IEC 61131-3 such as Ladder Logic). The rmware is hard to modify for the attacker because it has to be signed by the corresponding vendor’s private key [19]. The attacker may nd and utilize any debugging/testing ports (such as JTAG/UART) at hardware level to compromise the rmware [17]. However, this requires physical access, which makes it impractical as a remote attack.
The control logic de nes how a PLC controls a physical process. Unfortunately, it is vulnerable to malicious modi cations because PLCs either do not support digital signatures for control logic, or the ICS operators do not use/con gure them. The adversaries target the control logic to manipulate the control behavior of the PLC. For instance, Stuxnet targets Siemens S7-300 PLCs that are speci cally connected with variable frequency drives [15]. It infects the control logic of the PLCs to monitor the frequency of the attached motors, and only launches an attack if the frequency is within a certain nor- mal range (i.e. 807 Hz and 1,210 Hz). The attack involves disrupting the normal operation of the motors by changing their motor speed periodically from 1,410 Hz to 2 Hz to 1,064 Hz and then over again.
For the purposes of our discussion, we de ne engineering oper- ations as a continuous cycle of developing and updating the PLC control logic in response to changing operational requirements in ICS. A vendor-supplied programing software is used to create a control logic program and then to transfer it to/from a remote PLC over the network. In case of an incident, a forensic investigator (or a control operator) is likely to use the software to acquire the control logic from a suspicious PLC since the PLCs are often located at remote sites that may be di cult to get to.
We present three new attack scenarios, referred to as denial of engineering operations (DEO) attacks that subvert the capability of the programing software to acquire the actual control logic from an infected PLC.
https://fhi.nl/app/uploads/sites/37/2014/09/politie3.pdf
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/283086676_Cyberspace_and_International_Politics
2007 June 29: GPLv3 and LGPLv3 have been released!
https://theintercept.com/2019/01/30/prison-voice-prints-databases-securus/
¹ to be continued
² to be continued
³ to be continued
This article presents a timeline of events in the history of Microsoft Windows operating systems from 1985.
This article is about the consumer operating system released in 1992. For the version of Windows NT released in 1993, see Windows NT 3.1.
Hack Computer System For Noobee
Door KISHOR SARKAR
https://fsfe.org/campaigns/pdfreaders/pdfreaders.html#translations
https://muspdf.cf/catupm/computers-and-internet
https://www.securityfocus.com/columnists/188
https://doc.lagout.org/security/
https://www.mail.com/email/
https://www.iusmentis.com/computerprogrammas/opensourcesoftware/gplv3/
http://smbp.uwaterloo.ca/2017/05/gmail-from-private-invitation-only-to-1-bln-users-worldwide/
Poort 3128 is de standaard poort voor de Squid proxy-server
So much for first impressions. I just hope I was able to enlighten you and in some way to help you make the right choice. Whether it's protecting yourself from what could be a traumatic life altering experience, or compelling you to focus your computer skills on other avenues, it's important for you to know the program, the language, and the rules. See you in the movies Agent Steal 1997
The social layer has two components: the personal component and the cyber-personal component. Of course, the personal and cyber-personal component do not apply only to individuals but also to organizations, with or without legal personality (public authorities, companies, associations, criminal groups, etc.). The personal component is made up of all the elements associated with an individual or organization in the network (e.g., e-mail address, IP address, account in a virtual store, home-banking account, etc.). The second component, the cyber-personal, is made up of all individuals or organizations that have access to the network. The problem arises when an individual or organization has multiplecyber identities, and this is a frequent occurrence. In other words, every person and/or organization frequently possesses one or more e-mail addresses, one or more devices (smartphones, laptops, tablets, etc.) connected to the network, and so on. At the same time it may happen that a cyber-person may represent several physical persons. An example is a company with a Facebook profile whose credentials (username and password) are known to many different individuals, for example, the employees of a company's Public Relations department.
Consider a car company. It might sell a dozen different types of cars with a dozen different software builds each year. Even assuming that the software gets updated only every two years and the company supports the cars for only two decades, the company needs to maintain the capability to update 20 to 30 different software versions. (For a company like Bosch that supplies automotive parts for many different manufacturers, the number would be more like 200.) The expense and warehouse size for the test vehicles and associated equipment would be enormous.
Alternatively, imagine if car companies announced that they would no longer support vehicles older than five, or ten, years. There would be serious environmental consequences.
We’re already seeing the effects of systems so old that the vendors stopped patching them, or went out of business altogether. Some of the organizations affected by WannaCry were still using Windows XP, an unpatchable 17-year-old operating system that Microsoft stopped supporting in 2014. About 140 million computers worldwide still run that operating system, including most ATMs. A popular shipboard satellite communications system once sold by Inmarsat Group is no longer patched, even though it contains critical security vulnerabilities. This is a big problem for industrial- control systems, because many of them run outdated software and operating systems, and upgrading them is prohibitively expensive because they’re very specialized. These systems can stay in operation for many years and often don’t have big IT budgets associated with them.
